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Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A. - 2015

We model competing groups when players' values for winning are private information, each group's performance equals the best effort ("best shot") of its members, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. At the symmetric equilibrium of symmetric contests, increasing the number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142038

Truth or efficiency? Communication in a sequential public good game

Serra-Garcia, Marta (contributor); … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003807183

The intricacy of adapting to climate change : flood protection as a local public goods game

Bondarev, Anton; Hintermann, Beat; Krysiak, Frank C.; … - 2017

We study adaptation to climate change in a federalist setting. To protect themselves against an increase in flood risk, regional governments choose among adaptation measures that vary with respect to their costs, the level of protection they offer, and the presence and nature of spillovers to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011616351

Information design in coalition formation games

Vosooghi, Sareh - 2017

information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents' actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The … coalition size, as a function of beliefs of agents, is an endogenous variable, induced by the information sender. The optimal … information mechanism from the general set of public information mechanisms, in coalition formation games is derived. I also apply …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660390

Whom are you talking with? : an experiment on credibility and communication structure

Grandjean, Gilles; Mantovani, Marco; Mauleon, Ana; … - 2014

The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418867

Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy

Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256

. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996

A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values

Kuzmics, Christoph - 2014

In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337703

Recognizing Contributors and Cost of Information : An Experiment on Public Goods

Samek, Anya - 2014

We experimentally investigate the impact of visibility of contributors and cost of information on public good contributions. First, we vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Second, we investigate the effect of imposing a cost on viewing contributors. Recognizing all contributors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013063986

Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies with State Dependent Preferences and Feasible Sets

Tian, Guoqiang - 1999

This paper considers Bayesian and Nash implementation in exchange economic environments with state dependent preferences and feasible sets. We fully characterize Bayesian implementability for both diffuse and non-diffuse information structures. We show that, in exchange economic environments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014208048

Failure to Collude in the Presence of Asymmetric Information

Jeon, Doh-Shin - 2002

In this paper, we study the transaction costs in coalition formation created by asymmetric information in a setting in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014116704