Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate information disclosure to increase expected efforts...

We study a design problem for an effort-maximizing principal in a two-player contest with two dimensions of asymmetry. Players have different skill levels and an information gap exists, as only one player knows the skill difference. The principal has two policy instruments to redress the lack of...

In the important contribution "All pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes" published in Games and Economic Behavior, May 2014, Minchuk and and Sela analyze an all pay auction with multiple prizes. The specific feature of the model is that all valuations are common except for the...

It is a well-established insight from the contest literature that greater heterogeneity between bidders tends to reduce the players' incentives to bid. Disclosure of information about bidders' types, e.g., revealing bidders' bid history, is one source of heterogeneity. This paper characterizes...