I consider a contest in which the quantity of output is rewarded and another in which the quality of output is rewarded. The output in the quality contest plays a dual role. It counts in the quality contest but it is also converted into quantity-equivalent output to obtain total output in the...

I study a model of procurement with moral hazard and adverse selection. The procurer is either corrupt or honest and can choose between sole-sourcing and competitive tender. I compare two procurement regulations: no sole-sourcing is allowed (rigid regulation) and sole-sourcing is allowed in an...

Some empirical studies have found that third-party intervention could worsen civil conflicts. However, exactly why this might be the case is not clear. This paper builds a model to explain how a third-party's expected intervention in a conflict could worsen the conflict. I study a two-period...

I consider a model in which an autocrat can invest in fiscal capacity and thus be able to tax his subjects (citizens). Investment in fiscal capacity is costless but comes with a demand for fiscal accountability by the citizens, something akin to the spirit of the slogan "no taxation without...

We study two all-pay auctions, where contestants cannot compete in both auctions. One contest has a higher prize than the other. Ideally, high-ability contestants should participate in the contest with a higher prize. We find that this is not necessarily the case. We show that the top contestant...