This survey covers recent literature on lobbying, with particular focus on corporate lobbying. Three main research traditions --- contestsfor policy rent, persuasion games, and multiple means models --- are analyzed in detail. Various strategic aspects of lobbying arepresented in the context of...

We model 'money buys access' informational lobbying as a commitment from the policy-maker to observe a lobby's verifiable evidence only upon receiving an access fee. We specifically examine the policy-maker's optimal access fees in the presence of two strictly competing lobbies. Our novel method...

If local public goods exhibit spillovers and regions are sufficiently symmetric, decentralization implies under provision, whereas cooperative centralization is associated with strict Pareto-improvement. This classic inference rests on two assumptions: local politicians are delegated sincerely...

We study how interest alignment between CEOs and corporate boards affects investment efficiency. The model entails a CEO who encounters an investment project and decides either or not to present it for approval to a board of directors. The CEO may need to collect and report investment-relevant...

We study how interest alignment between CEOs and corporate boards influences investment efficiency and identify a novel force behind the benefit of misaligned preferences. Our model entails a CEO who encounters a project, gathers investment-relevant information, and decides whether or not to...