. -- merger ; asymmetric information ; oligopoly ; single crossing …We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard … prediction of the lemons market model–if any, only low-type firms are traded–is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the …

We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect …, supplemented by entry fees. Since non-merged firms benefit from a merger if the synergies are low, bidders are subject to a … oligopoly game. …

We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard … prediction of the lemons market model-if any, only low-type firms are traded-is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the … difference between pre- and post-merger profits, are not necessarily higher for low-type firms. This has two implications. First …

We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect …, supplemented by entry fees. Since non-merged firms benefit from a merger if the synergies are low, bidders are subject to a … oligopoly game. …

standard oligopoly; above the higher threshold there is a unique equilibrium in which all firms disregard that impact as in …