studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averse -- exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior … of the correct candidate winning the election is bounded above by one half in at least one state. As a consequence, there …

We model an election between two Downsian mainstream candidates and a third inflexible politician. There is uncertainty …

Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but otherwise they are indistinguishable from real ballots. By means …

Majority voting is considered an efficient information aggregation mechanism in committee decision-making. We examine … acquisition, voting, and overall efficiency. …

Which decision rule should we use to make a binary collective choice? While voting procedures are applied ubiquitously … qualified majority voting. Our result shows that using a VCG mechanism is not superior to voting in general and justifies the … use of voting mechanisms. It thereby could explain why many decision rules employed in practice do not rely on monetary …