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Bounded rationality in laboratory bargaining with asymmetric information
Cason, Timothy N.; Reynolds, Stanley S. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 25 (2005) 3, pp. 553-574
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002703104
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Delegation to a group
Fehrler, Sebastian; Janas, Moritz - 2021
We study the choice of a principal to either delegate a decision to a group of careerist experts, or to consult them … individually and keep the decision-making power. Our model predicts a trade-off between information acquisition and information … can deliberate secretly. To test the model's key predictions, we run an experiment. The results from the laboratory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012549435
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The Lemon Car Game across cultures : evidence of relational rationality
Hofstede, Gert Jan; Jonker, Catholijn M.; Verwaart, Tim; … - In: Group decision and negotiation 28 (2019) 5, pp. 849-877
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012107534
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Litigation and settlement in a game with incomplete information : an experimental study
Ryll, Wolfgang - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000936524
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Cheap talk in bargaining experiments : lying and threats in ultimatum games
Croson, Rachel Toni Algaze; Boles, Terry; Murnighan, John K. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 51 (2003) 2, pp. 143-159
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001765413
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When Knowledge Isn't Power : Asymmetric Information, Probabilistic Deceit Detection and Threats in Ultimatum Bargaining
Ferreira, Mark - 2016
We find that probabilistic deceit detection and cheap-talk threats enhance the fairness and honesty of a bargainer who possesses advantageous information and has the opportunity to be deceitful. In our ultimatum game, only proposers know the size of the pie. Proposers, therefore, have the option...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013003880
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To Commit or Not to Commit? An Experimental Investigation of Pre-Commitments in Bargaining Situations with Asymmetric Information
Hoffmann, Sönke - 2014
likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over … their contribution costs. We test the model in a laboratory experiment paying particular attention to how behavioral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051610
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Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining
Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137
Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754119
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To commit or not to commit? : an experimental investigation of pre-commitments in bargaining situations with asymmetric information
Hoffmann, Sönke; Mihm, Benedikt; Weimann, Joachim - 2014
likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over … their contribution costs. We test the model in a laboratory experiment paying particular attention to how behavioral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361371
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To commit or not to commit? : an experimental investigation of pre-commitments in bargaining situations with asymmetric information
Hoffmann, Sönke; Mihm, Benedikt; Weimann, Joachim - In: Journal of public economics 121 (2015), pp. 95-105
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337114