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Fighting for lemons: the encouragement effect in dynamic contests with private information

Beccuti, Juan; Möller, Marc - 2020

This paper proposes a tractable model of a dynamic contest where players have private information about the contest's prize. We show that private information helps to encourage players who have fallen behind, leading to an increase in aggregate incentives. We derive the optimal information...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012318681

Signaling in Dynamic Contests with Heterogenous Rivals

Catepillan, Jorge; Figueroa, Nicolas; Lemus, Jorge - 2022

We study signaling in dynamic contests with heterogeneous players. A privately-informed challenger faces a sequence of rivals of known types. The type of future rivals determines which signal the challenger wants to produce, whereas the strategic response of current rivals determines the extent...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013292789

Contests : a comparison of timing and information structures

Ludwig, Sandra - 2011

We study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents. We consider four institutional settings: Contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information. We find that an effort-maximizing...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009124645

Information Design in Coalition Formation Games

Vosooghi, Sareh - 2017

information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents' actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The … coalition size, as a function of beliefs of agents, is an endogenous variable, induced by the information sender. The optimal … information mechanism from the general set of public information mechanisms, in coalition formation games is derived. I also apply …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012954130

Whom are you talking with? : an experiment on credibility and communication structure

Grandjean, Gilles; Mantovani, Marco; Mauleon, Ana; … - 2014

The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010418867

Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy

Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256

. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011694996

Information design in coalition formation games

Vosooghi, Sareh - 2017

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011660390

Sequential competitions with a middle-mover advantage

Kendall, Ryan - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 91 (2021), pp. 1-21

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012643417

Information Disclosure in Multistage Tournaments

Goltsman, Maria - 2017

Two agents participate in a tournament that has two stages: intermediate and final. The results of the intermediate stage are privately observed by the principal who organizes the tournament. Prizes for the winner and the loser are exogenously given, but the principal can enhance effort...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012706719

Signaling in Dynamic Contests with Heterogeneous Rivals1

Catepillan, Jorge; Figueroa, Nicolas; Lemus, Jorge - 2023

Should a challenger face rivals simultaneously or sequentially? If sequentially, should he face weak or strong rivals first? To address these questions, we study signaling in dynamic contests, where a privately-informed challenger faces a sequence of rivals. Against heterogenous opponents, the...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014260226