We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our …

that although correlation tightens the conditions on preferences for a truth-telling equilibrium, in the presence of … uncertainty, a high level of correlation may discipline the strongly biased expert and may foster the informational content of the … experts’ advice under high uncertainty about correlation. In contrast to what may be expected, it may be optimal for the …

better off under the dynamic mechanism relative to a Vickrey-like auction because the intermediaries are more able to exploit …-like auction. Finally, I show that in large markets the dynamic mechanism and Vickrey-like auction have the same expected total …

takeovers. After the auction, the winning bidder decides whether to make follow-up investments in the acquired asset and makes … the equity payment out of the revenue from it according to the auction outcome. Before the auction, the seller holds …

auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show …. We estimate the reserve price signaling model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. We find …

condition for total monotonicity. The REE is an efficient SCF so it is attainable by an auction if and only if it satisfies …

selling mechanism, including an auction, and release additional information about the house to buyers. Release of information … adjusts the buyers' values and bids. We find that the optimal mechanism is a combination of the optimal auction and full … information disclosure. But if the seller uses a second-price auction instead, concealing additional information about the house …