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We consider discriminatory auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly for multiple units. None of the usual assumptions about symmetry of players' distributions over values or of their equilibrium play are made. Because of this, equilibria will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824517
private and common valuations as special cases. We show that the key determinant of bidders' surplus (and implicitly auction … format of the auction matters. If bidders have constant marginal utilities for objects up to some limit, then uniform price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135082
average price in the auction is biased downward from the expected value of the objects, even in the competitive limit. In …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005482102