We propose a novel approach to the modelling of second-price Maximum-Value auctions that assumes no belief about others' behavior and no expected profit maximization. This individual decision-making model, naïve Impulse Balance Equilibrium or nIBE, deals with bidders' anticipated regrets from...

This paper investigates symmetric equilibria in first- and second-price auctions with multidimensional types. The constructed model mirrors the information structure of actual procurement auctions. We demonstrate by a counterexample that symmetric and continuous type distribution is not a...

This paper studies equilibrium selection in the generalized second price auction, employed by major search engines to sell online advertisement positions. We perturb the baseline model by introducing a bidder whose bid and participation are random (noise bidder). In this model, an efficient...

This paper considers a general package auction problem and a class of payment rules we refer to as standard. In a “standard” pricing rule, each winner pays at least his “minimum required value” to win. The minimum required value coincides with the payment in the Vickrey auction, and...

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability q and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition...

This paper studies multi-attribute auctions in which a buyer seeks to procure a complex good and evaluate offers using a quasi-linear scoring rule. Suppliers have private information about their costs, which is summarized by a multi-dimensional type. The scoring rule reduces the multidimensional...

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...