In this paper we present a new auction, the bisection auction, that can be used for the sale of a single indivisible object. We discuss the issue concerning the information revelation requirement of this auction and the associated amount of data that needs to be transmitted. We show that in the...

With a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of buy-options and the corresponding buy-price on revenues and bidding behavior in (online) proxy-auctions with independent private valuations. We show that temporary buy-options may reduce revenues for two reasons: At low buy-prices, the...

This paper studies the sales of a single indivisible object where bidders have continuous valuations. In Grigorieva et al. [13] it was shown that, in this setting, query auctions necessarily allocate ineffciently in equilibrium. In this paper we propose a new sequential auction, called the...

In this paper we present a new iterative acution, the bisection auction, that can be used for the sale of a single indivisible object. We will show that the bisection auction is computationally more efficient than the classical English auction while it still preserves all characteristics the...

In this paper we analyze the performance of a recently proposed sequential auction, called the c-bisection auction, that can be used for a sale of a single indivisible object. We discuss the running time and the efficiency in the ex-post equilibrium of the auction. We show that by changing the...