, deals with bidders' anticipated regrets from winning and from losing the auction. It exploits the stochastic properties of … the auction format and rationalizes: (i) Nash equilibrium bidding, (ii) (non-)monotone overbidding and (iii) fully cursed …

We study the relative performance of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction and the second-price sealed‐bid auction in a … reveals the winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first‐price sealed‐bid auction in which the winner …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … winner's payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner's payment is …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the … all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour …-bid auction in which the bidders’ payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism …

Recent research suggests that auction winners sometimes fall prey to a "bidder's curse", paying more for an item at … auction than they would have paid at a posted price. One explanation for this phenomenon is that bidders are inattentive to … to the opportunity cost of acquiring information about the posted price. We test our model in a laboratory experiment in …

and study expectations together with best replies. We extensively test the internal validity of this setup. We ?nd that …Deviations from equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies (see … Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) or correct expectations but small (perhaps quantal-response) mistakes in …

which allows to observe bids and expectations separately. We extensively test the internal validity of this setup. We find … difficult to explain this deviation with risk aversion. We propose and test two other explanations: (1) Bidders do not form … correct expectations. (2) Bidders do not play a best reply against their expectations. We present a novel experimental setup …

We present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding … experimental setup. To structure our data we present and test a theory of constant markdown bids. While a fraction of bidders can …

This paper presents the results of experiments carried out in two countries, Bulgaria and Germany, with different … allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value …-contests compares the bid functions, some features of the bidding behavior as well as the efficiency rates and the price expectations in …