Showing 1 - 10 of 1,113
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010236665
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010460908
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539857
This paper examines how a bidder can benefit from jump bidding by using the jump bid as a signal of a high valuation which causes other bidders to drop out of the auction earlier than they would otherwise. The information contained in a jump bid must be sufficient to induce a discrete change in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011940605
This paper examines how a bidder can benefit from jump bidding by using the jump bid as a signal of a high valuation which causes other bidders to drop out of the auction earlier than they would otherwise. The information contained in a jump bid must be sufficient to induce a discrete change in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005653207
The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427695
The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013382048
Takeover attempts from raiders with prior stakes in the target company (toeholds) are frequent in the market for corporate control. In this context, we propose a simple and realistic selling mechanism with an agenda of exclusive negotiations that discriminates against larger-toehold raiders....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010595312
This paper extends the Fishman (1988) model of preemptive jump bidding in private value takeover auction to auctions with common and affiliated values. We show that in the presence of a common value component, jump bidding equilibrium results in higher social surplus. Furthermore, we show that,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956628
This paper provides an analysis of takeover auctions in which target firms actively participate by changing their reserve prices. It considers a takeover auction as an affiliated-value English auction with flexible reserve price and discusses how the degree of value affiliation affects the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014120051