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Rationalizing (Non-)Equilibrium Bidding in Maximum-Value Auctions Without Beliefs About Others’ Behavior

Pezanis-Christou, Paul - 2019

We propose a novel approach to the modelling of second-price Maximum-Value auctions that assumes no belief about others' behavior and no expected profit maximization. This individual decision-making model, naïve Impulse Balance Equilibrium or nIBE, deals with bidders' anticipated regrets from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896753

Cross-Game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Kocher, Martin; Schudy, Simeon; … - 2021

Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314693

Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; … - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012668312

Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; … - 2022

Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476711

Learning and the Possibility of Losing Own Money Reduce Overbidding : Delayed Payment in Experimental Auctions

Zhang, Yu Yvette - 2017

received a cash endowment two weeks after the experiment day and had to use their own money to pay the experimental loss (if … any) on the experiment day. We compared the effect of delayed payment on overbidding in the induced value SPAs with the … conventional “on-the-spot” payment mechanism when the subjects received an endowment on the experiment day, and the prepaid …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971336

Cheap-talk communication in procurement auctions : theory and experiment

Onderstal, Sander; Yang, Yang - 2020

and in a laboratory experiment. Our theoretical results suggest that in a setting where the buyer and the suppliers have …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167341

Spite and reciprocity in auctions

Nishimura, Naoko; Cason, Timothy N.; Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; … - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 365-411

The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752417

Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? : an experimental investigation

Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; … - 2018

This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822038

Auctions and Fair Division Games - a Cross-Country Bidding Experiment

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - 2002

This paper presents the results of experiments carried out in two countries, Bulgaria and Germany, with different allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value-contests compares the bid functions, some features of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014121524

Auctions and Fair Division Games - a Cross-Country Bidding Experiment

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014123171