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Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions
Campbell, Colin M.; Cãrare, Octavian; MacLean, Richard P. - In: Economics letters 86 (2005) 1, pp. 95-100
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002516403
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Informational size and efficient auctions
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: The review of economic studies 71 (2004) 3, pp. 809-827
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002140230
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Implementation with Interdependent Valuations (Second Version)
McLean, Richard P. - 2013
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087801
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Information requirements for mechanism design
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2024
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015137801
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2013 - Rev., second version
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009741315
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392733
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A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Games and economic behavior 101 (2017), pp. 34-48
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788429
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A very robust auction mechanism
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819271
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132
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Implementation with Interdependent Valuations
McLean, Richard P. - 2006
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734128