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Asymmetric auctions

Maskin, Eric; Riley, John G. - In: The review of economic studies 67 (2000) 3, pp. 413-438

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001502114

Equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions

Maskin, Eric; Riley, John G. - In: The review of economic studies 67 (2000) 3, pp. 439-454

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001502116

Multi-unit auctions, price discrimination and bundling

Maskin, Eric; Riley, John G. - 1981 - 2. draft

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000789432

Auctions with asymmetric beliefs

Maskin, Eric; Riley, John G. - 1983 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000789433

Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions

Maskin, Eric; Riley, John G. - 1986

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000814775

Optimal multi-unit auctions

Maskin, Eric; Riley, John G. - In: The economics of missing markets, information, and games, (pp. 312-335). 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001272005

Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions

Maskin, Eric; Riley, John G. - In: Games and economic behavior 45 (2003) 2, pp. 395-409

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001826524

Asymmetric Auctions

Maskin, Eric; Riley, John G. - 2010

The revenue-equivalence theorm for auctions predicts that expected seller revenue is independent of the bidding rules, as long as equilibrium has the properties that the buyer with the highest reservation price wins and any buyer with the lowest possible reservation price has zero expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014148893

Ex post information in auctions

Riley, John G. - In: The review of economic studies 55 (1988) 3, pp. 409-429

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001084995

Elements of the theory of auctions and contests

Hirshleifer, Jack; Riley, John G. - 1978 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000791601