We model uniform and discriminatory auctions in wholesale electricity markets. High variability of electricity prices is often explained by exogenous economic factors. We, however, show that it can result endogenously from suppliers' strategic bidding, and that the connection between demand and...

In this technical note, we provide a complete proof of a theorem about the equilibrium structure in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Auction with demand elasticity. It is a companion to our full paper in B-E Auction (Hu, et al, 2010). The analysis in this note largely repeats the analysis in the original...

Motivated by supply competitions in the service sector, we consider a version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game where capacitated suppliers compete in prices to serve a deterministic demand and a price cap is imposed exogenously. We characterize the equilibrium structure for games with multiple...

In theory, combinatorial auctions can provide significant benefits in many real-world applications, such as truckload procurement. In practice, however, the use of such auctions has been greatly limited by the need for bidders to bid on an exponential number of bundles and for the auctioneer to...