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informational externalities (PIE). This assumption implies upward drifting price sequences at sequential auctions, which is … environment, in which the bidders' values can exhibit both PIE and NIE (negative informational externalities). The case of NIE can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441724
This paper studies when the presence of a small degree of ambiguity guarantees efficient implementation in general mechanism design settings. First, we show that if approximately efficient allocations are implementable in a Bayesian environment, then exactly efficient allocations are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848160
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to …. -- Fixed and Random Matching ; Incomplete Information ; Ex-Post Regret Learning ; Nash Equilibrium ; Ex-Post Equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967
This paper shows that in online car auctions, resellers are better at appraising the value of the cars they are bidding on than are consumers. Using a unique data set of online car auctions, I show that differences in bidding behavior between resellers and consumers can be explained by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430656
, learning through experimentation, or a preference for variety. The analysis uncovers the key tradeoffs that platforms face in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011858085
strategy relative to more traditional learning dynamics, and establish that, paradoxically, when sellers are strategic, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065183
paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second … independently from the identity of the winner. We prove that the first-price auction is not affected by this kind of price-externalities … by the presence of such price-externalities. In any case, in comparison with the first-price auction, the second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591224
This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop a procurement auction model where bidders can form bidding rings, and derive the bidding and collusive behavior under no sanction, debarment and fines. The model's predictions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822812
This article presents the first experiment exploring the impact of debarments - the exclusion of colluding bidders - on collusion in procurement auctions. We find that debarments and their most common alternative, fines, reduce collusion and bids relative to a market with no sanction. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852366