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In light of recent developments in auction theory, this Article re-examines Delaware corporate law governing directors' actions when structuring the sale of a corporation. A foundational doctrine of Delaware law is that when the board of directors resolves to sell a corporation, it must obtain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033404
We consider imperfectly discriminating, common-value, all-pay auctions (or contests) where some players know the value of the prize, others do not. We show that if the prize is always of positive value, then all players are active in equilibrium. If the prize is of value zero with positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055053
In this paper we undertake an empirical study of advertising in an online auctions market, or, more precisely …, advertising on eBay. The type of advertising that we consider works as follows: at the time of listing the item on eBay, sellers … new bidders, we can estimate the effect of advertising on the number of bidders, the distribution of bidders' valuations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026722
consumption by rendering brands a signalling device. In a price competition framework, we show that advertising increases …The paper formalizes the intuition that brands are consumed for image reasons and that advertising creates a brand …'s image. The key idea is that advertising informs the public of brand names and creates the possibility of conspicuous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366557
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196760
We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077334
We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082600
We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behavior to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953306
We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behavior to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953920
We study all-pay auctions where each player observes her private value as well as a noisy private signal about the opponent’s value, following Fang and Morris’s (J Econ Theory 126(1):1–30, 2006) analysis of winner-pay auctions with multidimensional private signals. A unique symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013235168