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Sequential procurement with contractual and experimental learning

Gur, Yonatan; Macnamara, Gregory; Saban, Daniela - 2019

We study the design of sequential procurement strategies that integrate stochastic and strategic information. We … buyer makes a price offer to a seller who has private, persistent information regarding his cost and quality of provision … the buyer's outside option, the buyer uses one form of information: either strategic or stochastic. If both seller types …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065183

Implementation with interdependent valuations

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations (Second Version)

McLean, Richard P. - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087801

Contests with Ex-Ante Target Setting

Robertson, Matthew J. - 2019

I study contests in which each player is ranked by a scoring rule based on both her performance and how close this performance is to a private target, set before the contest. Each player's decision problem is to choose her target when performance is subject to a random component. I analyse the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012862676

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations

McLean, Richard P. - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734128

The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces

Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - 2017 - This version: February 8, 2017

McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in naive type spaces with a continuum of payoff types. We generalize their characterization to arbitrary abstract type spaces and to the universal type space and show that in each setting, full...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011604046

Simultaneous signaling in elimination contests

Zhang, Jun (contributor) - 2008

This paper analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Depending on his valuation, a contestant may have an incentive to bluff or sandbag...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003768858

Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information

Deng, Shanglyu; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 2, pp. 705-742

This paper provides a general study of a contest modeled as a multiplayer incomplete-information, all-pay auction with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576711

Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching : the case of private values

Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010

understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact …. -- Fixed and Random Matching ; Incomplete Information ; Ex-Post Regret Learning ; Nash Equilibrium ; Ex-Post Equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967

An equilibrium analysis of Knaster’s fair division procedure

Van Essen, Matthew - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 21-37

In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753712