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A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices

Brams, Steven J.; Kaplan, Todd R.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 2012

We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism whereby for two bargainers, a Buyer and a Seller, it is a weakly dominant strategy to report their reservation prices in the 1st stage. If the Buyer reports a higher price than the Seller, then the referee announces that there is the possibility for trade,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043989

Online Dispute Resolution and Bargaining

Gabuthy, Yannick - 2014

The automated negotiation process seems to be a powerful mechanism to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. Automated negotiation is an online blind-bidding process in which an automated algorithm evaluates bids from the parties and settles the case if the offers are within...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027208

Auctions Versus Bilateral Bargaining : Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Pogrebna, Ganna - 2007

This paper uses data from a natural experiment to compare two institutions: a simple English auction and bilateral …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053617

Resistance to Truthful Revelation in Bargaining : Persistent Bid Shading and the Play of Dominated Strategies

Parco, James E.; Murphy, Ryan O. - 2013

We report results from a simultaneous bilateral bargaining experiment with attention to the effects of a settlement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014164378

Multistage Sealed-Bid k-Double Auctions : An Experimental Study of Bilateral Bargaining

Parco, James E.; Rapoport, Amnon; Seale, Darryl A.; … - 2008

We extend the sealed-bid k-double-auction mechanism from a single- to two-round game where offers are made simultaneously during each round. If an agreement is reached on round 1, then the traders realize their profit and the game is over. If not, equipped with information about the round 1 bids...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028808

Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting … no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503

Essays on efficiency and private information

Felgenhauer, Mike - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002040524

Bidding in Hierarchies

Konrad, Kai A. - 2011

This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073314

Bidding for Money

Julien, Benoit - 2016

We analyze monetary exchange in a model that allows for directed search and multilateral matches. We consider environments with divisible goods and indivisible money, and compare the results with those in models that use random matching and bilateral bargaining. Two different pricing mechanisms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012987706

Transactions that did not happen and their influence on prices

Kirman, Alan P.; Härdle, Wolfgang; Schulz, Rainer; … - 2002

This paper studies data from the wholesale fruit and vegetables market in Marseille. The special feature of the data is that we have details of counteroffers to the prices that were proposed by the seller even when no transaction took place. Each offer, counteroffer and refusal conveys...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009624846