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Houba, Harold; Laan, Dinard van der; Veldhuizen, Dirk - 2008

Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047495

Lottery Pricing under Time Pressure

Blavatskyy, Pavlo R.; Koehler, Wolfgang R. - 2009

This paper investigates how subjects determine minimum selling prices for lotteries. We design an experiment where …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206381

Contests with rank-order spillovers

Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Daniel J.; Vries, Casper G. de - 2009 - Revised: April 2009

-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine spillover effects that … economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where individuals …&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378808

Selling to Intermediaries : Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Bergemann, Dirk - 2017

We characterize revenue maximizing auctions when the bidders are intermediaries who wish to resell the good. The bidders have differential information about their common resale opportunities: each bidder privately observes an independent draw of a resale opportunity, and the highest signal is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949875

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2018

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders' independent signals. The optimal mechanism exhibits either neutral selection, wherein the object is randomly allocated at a price that all bidders are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011948704

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

A single unit of a good is to be sold by auction to one of two buyers. The good has either a high value or a low value, with known prior probabilities. The designer of the auction knows the prior over values but is uncertain about the correct model of the buyers' beliefs. The designer evaluates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977350

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

We study auction design when bidders have a pure common value equal to the maximum of their independent signals. In the revenue maximizing mechanism, each bidder makes a payment that is independent of his signal and the allocation discriminates in favor of bidders with lower signals. We provide...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977351

Chapter 4. Assessment and Estimation of Risk Preferences

Holt, Charles A.; Laury, Susan K. - In: Handbook of the economics of risk and uncertainty : volume 1, (pp. 135-201). 2014

effects of risk aversion on observed behavior in economic in settings, e.g. bargaining, auctions, and contests. Some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025528

Voluntary contributions with risky and uncertain marginal returns : the importance of the minimal value

Levati, M. Vittoria; Morone, Andrea - 2009

Previous research indicates that risky and uncertain marginal returns from the public good significantly lower contributions. This paper presents experimental results illustrating that the effects of risk and uncertainty depend on the employed parameterization. Specifically, if the value of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003887174

Stochastic asymmetric Blotto games : an experimental study

Duffy, John; Matros, Alexander - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 139 (2017), pp. 88-105

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852837