This paper proposes a simple model for multiple second-price auctions which run parallel to each other, in the sense that though they might not begin or end at the same time, they have certain periods of overlap. We characterize the equilibrium bidding strategy of the buyers and the equilibrium...

An auctioneer faces a pool of potential bidders that changes over time. She can delay the auction at a cost, in the hopes of having a thicker market later on. We identify a property of the distribution of bidder values—its “price elasticity”—that governs the distortions caused by revenue...

This paper extends the results in Hidvegi et al. (2006) to the case when the number of bidders is common knowledge in an English auction with buy-out. In that case when some bidders drop out, the remaining bidders have to update their information, and change the threshold auction price at which...

Motivated by challenges facing IT procurement, this paper studies a hybrid procurement model where a reverse auction of a fixed-price IT outsourcing contract may be followed by renegotiation to extend the contract's scope. In this model, the buyer balances the need to incentivize...

The paper considers an ascending price auction with two bidders, in which the buyers are given the additional option to obtain the object immediately by paying a fixed price (the buy-out price). We completely characterize the optimal bidding strategy of the bidder and the optimal buy-out price...

We present a model of a discriminatory price auction in which a large bidder competes against many small bidders, followed by a post-auction resale stage in which the large bidder is endogenously determined to be a buyer or a seller. We extend results on first-price auctions with resale to this...

A platform matches agents from two sides of a market to create a trading opportunity between them. The agents subscribe to the platform by paying subscription fees which are contingent on their reported private types, and then engage in strategic interactions with their matched partner(s). A...

We consider a general scheme to construct Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms using a suitable 'variable mechanism parametrization.' The key idea is to perturb a given direct mechanism, which might not be truth revealing, introducing sufficient variability as a function of agents'...

We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private value. Assuming that the seller adopts Myerson (1981) optimal auction in response, we characterize both...

The standard profit-maximizing multi-unit auction can be represented as the Vickrey-Groves-Clarke mechanism in which the seller manipulates his reservation supply curve. The optimal supply curve depends on the distribution from which the buyers' valuations are drawn. However, when this...