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Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able contestant in favor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013126710
Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of bidders with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able bidder in favor of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403250
Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able contestant in favor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008906067
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008909134
Contest designers or managers who want to maximize the overall revenue of a contest (relative performance scheme) are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011638535
experimentellen Test unterzogen. Es zeigt sich, dass sich der Ausschluss des stärksten Teilnehmers nie lohnt, da sich dieser weit über …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009408046
-strategy equilibrium solutions to the two auctions, and then test them in a sequence of experiments that vary the number of bidders and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014225497
This paper experimentally examines a procedurally fair provision mechanism allowing members of a small community to determine, via their bids, which of four alternative public projects to implement. Previous experiments with positive cost projects have demonstrated that the mechanism is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009784119
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620765
Based on an axiomatically derived provision rule allowing community members to endogenously determine which, if any, public project should be provided, we perform experiments where (i) not all parties benefit from provision, and (ii) the projects' "costs" can be negative. In the tradition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009567095