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Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games

Fallucchi, Francesco; Renner, Elke; Sefton, Martin - 2012

We investigate the role of information feedback in rent-seeking games with two different contest structures. In the stochastic contest a contestant wins the entire rent with probability equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures; in the deterministic contest she receives a share of the rent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009618920

Implementation in Iterative Elimination of Obviously Dominated Strategies : An Experiment on King Solomon's Dilemma

Hagiwara, Makoto - 2020

“King Solomon's Dilemma” is based on a biblical story and this can be considered as an allocation problem for an indivisible object among two players. An allocation is first-best if a social planner wants to assign the object without payment to the player whose valuation is the highest. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012836381

Cross-Game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Kocher, Martin; Schudy, Simeon; … - 2021

study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills … losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for … bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, cross-game learning has the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314693

Sabotage in Contests : A Survey

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. - 2013

A contest is a situation in which individuals expend resources in order to win valuable prize(s). 'Sabotage' is a deliberate, and often costly and illegal, act of damaging a rival's likelihood of winning the contest. It is done by exerting resources to negatively influence the effectiveness of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074732

Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments

Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2013

We provide an overview of experimental literature on lottery contests and point out the two main phenomena observed in most contest experiments: overbidding relative to the standard Nash equilibrium prediction and heterogeneous behavior of ex-ante symmetric contestants. Based on the sample of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162119

Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction : An Experimental Study

Riedl, Arno; Bosman, Ronald - 2003

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a first price auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with a positive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions and bidding behavior in a second...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014030294

The Visible Hand : Finger Ratio (2D:4D) and Competitive Bidding

Pearson, Matthew - 2011

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we scan also the right hand of each subject. We study how the ratio of the length of the index and ring fingers (2D:4D) of the right hand, a measure of prenatal hormone exposure, is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134493

Sex hormones and competitive bidding

Schipper, Burkhard - 2014

We correlate competitive bidding and profits in symmetric independent private value first-price auctions with salivary testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol in more than 200 subjects. Bids are significantly positively correlated and profits are significantly negatively correlated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250541

Sex hormones and competitive bidding

Schipper, Burkhard - 2012

We correlate competitive bidding and profits in symmetric independent private value first-price auctions with salivary testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol in more than 200 subjects. Females bid significantly higher and earn significantly lower profits than males. Moreover,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544159

The visible hand : finger ratio (2D:4D) and competitive bidding

Pearson, Matthew; Schipper, Burkhard - 2011 - This version: October 25, 2011

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values and 400 subjects, we scan also the right hand of each subject. We study how the ratio of the length of the index and ring fingers (2D:4D) of the right hand, a measure of prenatal hormone...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544212