We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to …

This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing …

This paper revisits the licensing of a non-drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly …. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more … profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …

This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing a cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot … oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers … licensing without reducing bidders' surplus; therefore, it is more profitable than both standard license auctions and pure …

Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished … from standard ones by the patents being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption--that is, they are club goods …

We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and … payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive …

Perfectly discriminating contests (or all pay auction) are widely used as a model of situations where individuals … devote resources to win some prize. In reality such contests are often preceded by investments of the contestants into their …