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A winner determination problem of tendering transportation services

Norden, Linda van; Nunen, Jo A. E. E. van; Velde, Steef … - In: Journal of business economics : JBE 76 (2006) 2, pp. 125-137

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003286146

Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

Chen, Bo; Chen, Bo - In: Games and economic behavior 143 (2024), pp. 204-222

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014449976

On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions

Chen, Bo - In: Economics letters 177 (2019), pp. 60-65

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012121495

Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry

Chen, Bo - In: Economics letters 191 (2020), pp. 1-5

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012508516

Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with affiliated values

Chen, Bo; Serena, Marco; Wang, Zijia - In: Economic modelling 141 (2024), pp. 1-8

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015192264

An investigation of the average bid mechanism for procurement auctions

Chang, Wei-shiun; Chen, Bo; Salmon, Tim - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 61 (2015) 6, pp. 1237-1254

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011293394

Supplier competition with option contracts for discrete blocks of capacity

Anderson, Edward J.; Chen, Bo; Shao, Lusheng - In: Operations research 65 (2017) 4, pp. 952-967

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011739066

On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry

Chen, Bo; Jiang, Xiandeng; Knyazev, Dmitriy - In: Journal of mathematical economics 70 (2017), pp. 66-73

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011825964

A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information

Liu, Zhiyang; Chen, Bo - In: Economics letters 145 (2016), pp. 6-10

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011618117

On Disclosure Policies in All-pay Auctions with Stochastic Entry

Chen, Bo - 2019

The contest entails one prize and n potential bidders. Each bidder receives a signal about the value of the prize and has a signal-dependent probability of participation. All bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids. It is shown that the contest organizer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903881