We conduct laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among the subjects without advice stays at 20%, whereas the rate increases to 47% among those who have received advice. By conducting similar...

The article refers to the issue of the endowment effect, which acts as a mechanism that influences valuation. The paper’s main aim is to verify the endowment effect phenomenon for branded, fast-moving consumer goods. The subject of this paper also includes examining whether short-term...

In procurement auctions, bidders are usually better informed about technical, financial, or legal aspects of the goods and services procured. Therefore, the buyer may include a dialogue in the procurement procedure which enables the suppliers to reveal information that will help the buyer to...

This paper reconsiders experimental tests of the English clock auction. We point out why the standard procedure can only use a small subset of all bids, which gives rise to a selection bias. We propose an alternative yet equivalent format that makes all bids visible, and apply it to a 'wallet...

We report an experiment on a decision task by SAMUELSON and BAZERMAN (1985). Subjects submit a bid for an item with an unknown value. A winner s curse phenomenon arises when subjects bid too high and make losses. Learning direction theory can account for this. However, other influences on...

We consider innovation contests for the procurement of an innovation under moral hazard and adverse selection. Innovators have private information about their abilities, and choose unobservable effort in order to produce innovations of random quality. Innovation quality is not contractible. We...

We study efficient auction design for a single indivisible object when bidders have interdependent values and non-quasilinear preferences. Instead of quasilinearity, we assume only that bidders have positive wealth effects. Our setting nests cases where bidders are ex ante asymmetric, face...

We compare equilibrium bidding in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when a single large bidder (i.e., with multi-unit demand) competes against many small bidders, each with single-unit demands. We show that the large bidder prefers the discriminatory auction over the uniform-price...

We study manipulation via endowments in a market in an auction setting with multiple goods. In the market, there are buyers whose valuations are their private information, and a seller whose set of endowments is her private information. A social planner, who wants to implement a socially...

I study multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multi-unit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the...