This note explains a new type of auction based on an existing derivatives risk-management technique known as “compression.” A compression auction can be used to convert centrally cleared contracts on an underlying benchmark, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), to contracts on...

We calculate equilibria of dynamic double-auction markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors are segmented into groups that differ with respect to characteristics determining information...

We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and o ffers. Investors diff er with respect to information quality, including initial information precision, and also...

We explain how the common practice of size-discovery trade detracts from overallfinancial market efficiency. At each of a series of size-discovery sessions, traders report theirdesired trades, generating allocations of the asset and cash that rely on the most recent exchangeprice. Traders can...

The Federal Reserve uses (reverse) auctions to implement its purchases of Treasury bonds in quantitative easing. To evaluate dealers' offers across multiple bonds, the Fed relies on its internal yield-curve model, fitted to secondary market bond prices. From November 2010 to September 2011, a...