We investigate optimal rationing of resources and organizational slack when a principal procures from an agent with private information about fixed and variable costs. We study the problem in a two-period setting with persistent types and investigate how the optimal rationing and slack depend on...

We investigate optimal rationing of resources and organizational slack when a principal procures from an agent with private information about fixed and variable costs. We study the problem in a two‐period setting with persistent types and investigate how the optimal rationing and slack depend...

Internet auctions are an important resource in the business-to-business (B2B) market for companies that want to save money and increase profits. Understanding how auctions work on the Internet is mandatory in today's marketplace. Auctions can be used to do everything from selling excess...

This study investigates the design of the royalty rate in a first-price auction across three types of investments: incremental and lumpy with or without an exogenously given intensity. A bidder's investment cost comprises private information. This, together with the stochastic evolution of the...

This study addresses the need to account for unobserved heterogeneity in auctions to improve our estimates of the distribution of bidder values. The method uses reserve prices to allow the distribution of bidders' private information to depend on the realization of the unobserved heterogeneity....

We present an experimental test of a procedurally fair co-determination mechanism where group members reduce their value uncertainty before submitting bids for a joint project. The results suggest a relatively efficient mechanism, with unprofitable projects being largely rejected and profitable...

This contribution revisits the problem of allocating R&D subsidies by government agencies. Typically, the applicants' financial constraints are private information. The literature has recommended the use of auctions in order to reduce information rents and thus improve the efficiency of how...

In this paper, we present an analytical bid stack model for the electricity market which is extended to the case of an arbitrary number N of technology classes embedded in the production stack (esp. for N 2). As bid stack model, the proposed framework represents a structural model that...

This paper presents a short survey of theoretical research in takeover auctions. It concentrates on the models of preemptive jump bidding and the effect of toeholds as well as the models that investigate the combination of these two effects

This paper presents implied volatility smiles and skews for plain vanilla electricity options based on a new bid stack model developed in a previous paper. This underlying bid stack model for the electricity market is extended to the case of an arbitrary number N of technology classes embedded...