We study the effects of different information structures (full information, supply uncertainty and demand uncertainty) on equilibrium prices, allocative efficiency and bidding behavior in a (supply-side) uniform-price multi-unit auction, using supply function competition and a novel experimental...

We study the effects of different information structures (full information, supply uncertainty and demand uncertainty) on equilibrium prices, allocative efficiency and bidding behavior in a (supply-side) uniform-price multi-unit auction, using supply function competition and a novel experimental...

Procurement auctions for renewable energy support have become a standard policy instrument to stimulate investment in clean energy. Yet, the nexus of award prices and post-auction realization rates of winning projects is not well understood in the literature. We combine auction theory and real...

We study experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty, motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. We study the effect of asymmetric demand-information in the two auction institutions. In our treatment condition some...

In an electricity system, demand and supply have to be balanced in real time. Since most energy is traded before real time already in forward, day-ahead and intraday markets imbalances can occur. To ensure the balance between demand and supply even if power plants deviate from their schedules,...

By means of a constructive example we show that clustering of Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) might give unsatisfactory results of zonal division of energy market. Specifically, we find that the division obtained from clustering of LMPs in some cases may not place the congested lines on the...

We study experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty, motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. We study the effect of asymmetric demand-information in the two auction institutions. In our treatment condition some...

I consider bidding behavior in the daily electricity auction in England and Wales. Theoretical work on uniform-price multiunit procurement auctions suggests that bidders offering more than one unit have an incentive to increase their bids at high quantities. If a bid sets a high equilibrium...

Short-term electricity markets are key to an efficient production by generation units. We develop a two-period model to assess different bidding formats to determine for each bidding format the optimal bidding strategy of competitive generators facing price-uncertainty. We compare the results...

We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing. We...