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This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950481
We study an elimination tournament with heterogenous contestants whose ability is common-knowledge. Each pair-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction where the winner gets the right to compete at the next round. Equilibrium efforts are in mixed strategies, yielding rather complex play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343975
We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418053
As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025452
We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated and communication equilibria are payoff equivalent to the Nash equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is commonly known that one bidder has a strictly higher value....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009745257
Perfectly discriminating contests (or all pay auction) are widely used as a model of situations where individuals … devote resources to win some prize. In reality such contests are often preceded by investments of the contestants into their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343949
where no contestant would wish to change his choice of contest, results in the allocation of players to contests that … maximizes aggregate equilibrium effort. For a class of oligopoly models that are equivalent to contests, this implies output …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718621
We consider mechanisms for allocating a common-value prize between two players in an incomplete information setting. In this setting, each player receives an independent private signal about the prize value. The signals are from a discrete distribution and the value is increasing in both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360354
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