We model uniform and discriminatory auctions in wholesale electricity markets. High variability of electricity prices is often explained by exogenous economic factors. We, however, show that it can result endogenously from suppliers' strategic bidding, and that the connection between demand and...

Motivated by supply competitions in the service sector, we consider a version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game where capacitated suppliers compete in prices to serve a deterministic demand and a price cap is imposed exogenously. We characterize the equilibrium structure for games with multiple...

We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all...

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the...

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the...

We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to privately bear the cost of...

We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing. We...

We analyze how market design influences the bidding behavior in multi-unit procurement auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs and are uncertain about the availability of production units, as in wholesale electricity markets. We find that the competitiveness of market outcomes improves...

We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice...

We consider a general auction model with infinitely divisible commodity and price functions and give a new existence result in the case of the unbounded feasible set. We show that equilibrium states in the Cournot oligopoly can be attained via this auction mechanism. This property holds also...