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Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? : an experimental investigation

Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; … - 2018

This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822038

Information and Coordination Frictions in Experimental Posted Offer Markets

Helland, Leif - 2016

able to serve all potential customers. Such capacity constraints can lead to coordination frictions where some sellers and … the experiment, the differences between the constrained and non-constrained case are confirmed; prices fall when sellers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992604

Competition modulates buyers' reaction to sellers' cheap talk

Onderstal, Sander; Shalvi, Shaul; Soraperra, Ivan - 2023

-binding price requests. Using a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition moderates the way such cheap-talk communication … granularity effects of cheap-talk communication on negotiation outcomes. Our results show that most of these effects survive with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299618

Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination : an experiment

Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Hayashi, Takashi; Lombardi, Michele; … - 2021

mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them. In our simple laboratory experiment setting that … coordination across sectors. Our results show that coordination failure occurs more frequently when there is asymmetry between the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012604034

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2018

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders' independent signals. The optimal mechanism exhibits either neutral selection, wherein the object is randomly allocated at a price that all bidders are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011948704

Optimal Information Disclosure in Competing Contests with Capacity Constrained Players

Antsygina, Anastasia - 2021

This paper studies optimal information disclosure in competing contests with identical players. Each player faces a capacity constraint on the total effort contribution and is ex ante uninformed about the difficulty of the task to be performed in one of the contests. The task can be either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212097

Strategies under strategic uncertainty

Mass, Helene - 2018

I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016

The design of ambiguous mechanisms

Di Tillio, Alfredo; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2014

This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399062

The impact of the irrelevant : temporary buy-options and bidding behavior in auctions

Peeters, Ronald; Strobel, Martin; Vermeulen, Dries; … - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-19

With a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of buy-options and the corresponding buy-price on revenues and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453215

Optimal Information Disclosure in Contests with Communication

Antsygina, Anastasia - 2021

probability in the communication game, and this creates an externality (which can be either positive or negative) for the designer …. The optimal disclosure policy depends on both the communication technology and the correlation between the contestants … sufficiently high. These results are in a stark contrast with the no communication benchmark …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212098