Evidence increasingly points to the importance of reference-dependence in predicting consumer behavior. We utilize detailed data from penny auctions, which first appeared as an internet phenomenon in the late 2000's, to uncover how consumers' prior experiences predict their willingness to try a...

We consider a large class of 2-contestant Colonel Blotto games, for which the budget and valuation are both asymmetric between players and the contest success functions are in Tullock form with battle-specific discriminatory power in (0, 1] and battle-and-contestant-specific lobbying...

We study the information design for effort maximization in a simultaneous two-player two-type all-pay auction contest environment, where players have private information about their own valuations. Full characterization of the optimal signal crucially rests on the notion of ridge distributions:...

We consider a large class of 2-contestant Colonel Blotto games, for which the budget and valuation are both asymmetric between players and the contest success functions are in Tullock form with battle-specific discriminatory power in (0, 1] and battle-and-contestant-specific lobbying...

We study the incentives of players to disclose information on their private valuations of the prize ahead of a rent-seeking contest. We show that information sharing can arise in equilibrium if types are concentrated enough, whereas sharing information is strictly dominated if types are...

We study the optimal information disclosure policy in a two-player all-pay auction contest with one-sided asymmetric information in both simultaneous move setup and sequential move setup. The designer can pre-commit to a signal device that generates a type-dependent distribution, signaling the...

We generalize Klumpp, Konrad and Solomon’s model (KKS Model) to multi-contestant sequential Colonel Blotto Games with prize functions where any contestant’s prizes only depend on this contestant’s own number of winning rounds. We show that with weakly monotonic prize functions and CSFs...

We generalize Klumpp, Konrad and Solomon's model (KKS Model) to multi-contestant sequential Colonel Blotto Games with prize functions where any contestant's prizes only depend on this contestant's own number of winning rounds. We show that with weakly monotonic prize functions and CSFs...