Similar Search Results

Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the impossibility of pure information intermediation

Dworczak, Piotr - 2016

A mediator, with no prior information and no control over the market protocol, attempts to redesign the information structure in the market by running an information intermediation mechanism with transfers that first elicits information from an agent, and then discloses information to another...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865067

Cheap Talk Advertising in Auctions

Jewitt, Ian; Li, Daniel Z. - 2021

This paper explores how a seller should transmit product information to bidders with horizontally differentiated preferences. Under cheap-talk, we show that, in an informative equilibrium, the seller provides less precise information for more popular product attributes. Second, for any given...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250400

Optimal Information Disclosure in Contests with Communication

Antsygina, Anastasia - 2021

probability in the communication game, and this creates an externality (which can be either positive or negative) for the designer …. The optimal disclosure policy depends on both the communication technology and the correlation between the contestants … sufficiently high. These results are in a stark contrast with the no communication benchmark …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212098

Sequential procurement with contractual and experimental learning

Gur, Yonatan; Macnamara, Gregory; Saban, Daniela - 2019

We study the design of sequential procurement strategies that integrate stochastic and strategic information. We consider a buyer who repeatedly demands a certain good and is unable to commit to long-term contracts. In each time period, the buyer makes a price offer to a seller who has private,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065183

Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? : an experimental investigation

Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; … - 2018

This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822038

The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces

Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - 2017 - This version: February 8, 2017

McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in naive type spaces with a continuum of payoff types. We generalize their characterization to arbitrary abstract type spaces and to the universal type space and show that in each setting, full...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011604046

Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents

Song, Yangwei - 2018

We consider a single object allocation problem with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. When agents' signals are statistically independent, Jehiel and Moldovanu [Efficient design with interdependent valuations, Econometrica, 69(5):1237-1259, 2001] show that efficient and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900076

Keeping the agents in the dark : competing mechanisms, private disclosures, and the revelation principle

Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Mariotti, Thomas; … - 2025

We study the design of market information in competing-mechanism games. We identify a new dimension, private disclosures, whereby the principals asymmetrically inform the agents of how their mechanisms operate. We show that private disclosures have two important effects. First, they can raise a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015427014

Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the optimality of cutoff mechanisms

Dworczak, Piotr - 2016

I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063

Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale Via Bargaining

Zhang, Jun - 2016

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989366