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We consider a simple contest game with draws where with some probability none of the contestants is selected as winner. If such an outcome occurs, then the contest is repeated in the next period unless either one of the contestants wins the prize or until a final last period is reached. Allowing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014285495
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967
We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199987
We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215953
We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014091033
In clock games, agents receive differently-timed private signals when an asset value is above its fundamental. The price crashes to the fundamental when K of N agents have decided to sell. If selling decisions are private, bubbles can be sustained because people delay selling, after receiving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138044
We investigate the role of information feedback in rent-seeking games with two different contest structures. In the stochastic contest a contestant wins the entire rent with probability equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures; in the deterministic contest she receives a share of the rent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009618920
This paper studies the effect of trade opportunities on a seller's incentive to acquire information through experimentation. I characterize the unique equilibrium outcome and discuss the effects of variations in the information structure on the probability of trade. The main result is that more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212783
Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314693