This paper analyzes optimal auction design when delivery of supply is uncertain. We consider a buyer facing multiple potential suppliers, each having an associated (exogenous) reliability that quantifies its risk of supply failure. We design optimal mechanisms that depend on the buyer's level of...

We investigate procurement in a setting in which the buyer is bound by sourcing rules. Sourcing rules may limit the minimum and maximum amounts of business that can be awarded to a single supplier or dictate the minimum number of suppliers who are awarded business, thus necessitating split...

In this paper we study two reverse auction formats in a single period setting, the sealed pay-as-bid and the open format, when suppliers are capacity constrained. In the pay-as-bid format we characterize the asymmetric bidding equilibrium for the case of two suppliers with uniformly distributed...

Supplier non-performance is an ever present problem for an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) buyer and past survey-based research has shown that increasing supplier competition adversely affects their performance. Using a reverse auction setting in which supplier competition is determined by...

We consider sealed and open-bid total-cost procurement auctions where two attributes are used for contract award decisions: price, which is bid by the supplier; and a fixed quality adjustment cost, which is included by the buyer to capture non-price factors such as a supplier's quality and...