This paper addresses the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. In the case where the agents' information is correlated across time, we construct efficient and incentive compatible direct...

This paper studies wars of attrition between two players who have known values for the prizes but private budget constraints. Budgets limit the length that players can stay in the game. We examine the impact of budgets on the equilibrium outcomes. In the case where players' private budget is...

This paper studies sequential auctions in the presence of Knightian uncertainty about the distribution of values. We propose equilibrium notions based on the multiple selves approach to deal with the possible time inconsistency that arises with dynamic bidding for max-min bidders. We...

This paper addresses the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. We construct efficient and incentive compatible dynamic mechanisms, based on the inter-temporal correlation of different...

This paper considers the problem of equilibrium selection in a common-value second-price auction with two bidders. We show that for each ex post equilibrium in continuous and undominated strategies of the common-value auction, a sequence of "almost common-value" auctions can be constructed such...