In many auctions, buyers are represented by an intermediary that manages their bidding process, along with that of other buyers. Notably, this is prevalent in the real-time online display advertising market, in which advertisers bid for impressions through intermediaries called demand side...

A seller wants to sell an indivisible item to n buyers. The buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution, but the seller does not know this distribution; the seller only knows the support [a,b]. To be robust against the lack of knowledge of the environment and buyers' behavior, the...

Ad Exchanges are emerging Internet markets where advertisers may purchase display ad placements, in real-time and based on specific viewer information, directly from publishers via a simple auction mechanism. Advertisers join these markets with a pre-specified budget and participate in multiple...

Classical Bayesian mechanism design relies on the common prior assumption, but the common prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent mechanisms that relax this assumption: the seller is selling an indivisible item to n buyers such that the buyers’...