In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of …

In auctions with externalities, the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and fairness. We …

The paper studies when efficient allocations are implementable via coalition-proof mechanisms. When ambiguous … implementable via interim coalition incentive compatible mechanisms if and only if the prior distribution of agents’ types satisfies … the Coalition Beliefs Determine Preferences (CBDP) property. When the CBDP property holds, these mechanisms can be …

We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game …) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable … which the bidders' final utility possibly depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a …

We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game …) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable … which the bidders' final utility possibly depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a …

Auctions can lead to efficient allocations in a wide class of assignment problems. In the presence of externalities … auctioneer's preferences over final outcomes. Externalities affecting non-participants can thus be accounted for …