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We study the design of sequential procurement strategies that integrate stochastic and strategic information. We consider a buyer who repeatedly demands a certain good and is unable to commit to long-term contracts. In each time period, the buyer makes a price offer to a seller who has private,...
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We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receivers inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015326255
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196760
This paper analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Depending on his valuation, a contestant may have an incentive to bluff or sandbag...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003768858
equilibria with monotone beliefs of the resulting signalling game and show that they lead to a reduced probability of selling the … good compared to the symmetric information situation. We compare the unique separating equilibrium of this signalling game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064734
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
We consider a single object allocation problem with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. When agents' signals are statistically independent, Jehiel and Moldovanu [Efficient design with interdependent valuations, Econometrica, 69(5):1237-1259, 2001] show that efficient and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900076
We analyze takeover operations in which (i) bidding firms are risk-averse; (ii) offers can be made using cash or equity stakes; and (iii) acquirers have asymmetric information. We consider both non-competitive operations, in which a single acquirer initiates the takeover, and competitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014258241