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Cheap-talk communication in procurement auctions : theory and experiment

Onderstal, Sander; Yang, Yang - 2020

auction is beneficial to the buyer compared to no communication and ex-ante communication. In a setting where the buyer and … the winning supplier have misaligned interests regarding the terms, the buyer benefits from ex-ante communication relative … to no communication and ex-post communication. Our experimental data provide strong evidence for the predictions in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167341

Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503

Equilibrium and efficiency in the tug-of-war

Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Daniel J. - 2006

We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without exogenous noise, in which players have … the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in … by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365876

Information acquisition in conflicts

Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2010

This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950481

Spying in Contests

Chen, Zhuoqiong (Charlie) - 2019

Two players with independent private values compete for a prize in an all-pay contest. Before the contest, each player can spy on the opponent by privately acquiring a costly, noisy, and private signal about his private value. In a symmetric equilibrium of the contest where players spy on each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902624

Winners' Efforts in Multi-Battle Team Contests

Barbieri, Stefano; Serena, Marco - 2021

Multi-battle team contests are ubiquitous in real-life competitions. All temporal structures of multi-battle team contests yield the same total effort, as demonstrated by Fu, Lu, and Pan (2015, American Economic Review, 105(7): 2120-40)'s remarkable temporal-structure independence. Rather than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013235954

Optimal Sequential Contests

Hinnosaar, Toomas - 2018

I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928173

A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices

Brams, Steven J.; Kaplan, Todd R.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 2012

We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism whereby for two bargainers, a Buyer and a Seller, it is a weakly dominant strategy to report their reservation prices in the 1st stage. If the Buyer reports a higher price than the Seller, then the referee announces that there is the possibility for trade,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043989

The Effects of Post-Auction Bargaining between Bidders

Dworczak, Piotr - 2015

I study an auction model in which the auction is followed by bargaining between bidders. Bidders with multi-unit demand bid for an object and then bargain over additional units. In the presence of post-auction interaction between players, equilibrium bidding strategies are sensitive to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013030236

Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement : conference paper

Rosar, Frank; Müller, Florian - 2014 - (This version: February 5, 2014)

For a repeated procurement problem, we compare two stylized negotiating cultures which differ in how the buyer uses an entrant to exert pressure on the incumbent resembling U.S. style and Japanese style procurement. In each period, the suppliers are privately informed about their production...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490631