We provide a shorter proof of the main result in Reny and Perry (2006, Econometrica) by establishing a lower semicontinuity property of auctions as the number of traders goes to infinity, leveraging existence of equilibria in the limit auction. Our proof also eliminates two of the assumptions in...

Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of...

We study an economy with traders whose payoffs are quasilinear and their private signals are informative about an unobserved state parameter. The limit economy has infinitely many traders partitioned into a finite set of symmetry classes called types. It has a unique rational expectations...

We analyze takeover operations in which (i) bidding firms are risk-averse; (ii) offers can be made using cash or equity stakes; and (iii) acquirers have asymmetric information. We consider both non-competitive operations, in which a single acquirer initiates the takeover, and competitive...

Information dissemination and aggregation are key economic functions of financial markets. How intelligent do traders have to be for the complex task of aggregating diverse information (i.e., approximate the predictions of the rational expectations equilibrium) in a competitive double auction...