This online appendix contains the plots and supplemental descriptions for "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses."The paper "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses" to which this Supplement...

Structural asymmetric first-price auction estimation methods have provided numerous empirical studies. However, due to the unobserved nature of underlying valuations, the accuracy of estimates is not feasibly testable with field data, a fact that could inhibit empirical auction market designs...

This article explores the effect of a subset of symmetric bidders joining to bid together. Possible applications include mergers, collusion and legal joint-bidding arrangements. The change produces a "strong" party with a more advantageous value distribution than the remaining "weak" bidder(s)....

We study, theoretically and experimentally, sealed-bid first-price auctions with and without package bidding. In the model, a global bidder bids for multiple items and can benefit from synergies, while local bidders bid for a single item. In the equilibrium, package bidding improves (hurts)...