. We assess the performance of these auctions in a controlled experimental environment. The experiment has two treatments …: first-price and second-price auctions supplemented with Crémer–McLean lotteries. In the experiment, subjects cannot opt out …

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of …, we solve and compare the equilibria of "centralized college admissions" (CCA) in which students apply to all colleges …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams …. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college … admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions …" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) where students only apply to one …

what they think they are tasked with in the experiment. Adding a second auction that has a context drastically reduces the …