We consider a multi-item VCG auction setting where a bidder’s valuation of a bundle of items is additive, i.e., the sum of the individual item valuations in the bundle. We propose a direct mechanism, called the Pairwise Bundler Auction (PBA), where bidders report their individual item...

We examine the problem of identifying an optimal set of items to put up for sale (out of a larger set) in simultaneous sealed-bid auctions when pre-bidding item inspection or participation is costly, and the bidders' inspection budgets are limited. We first discuss how there can be uncertainty...

We study the auctioneer’s problem of social welfare maximization under a class of valuation functions, called the Pairwise-Additive Negative Value Externalities (PANE) functions, that captures some commonly-known forms of negative value externalities in the allocations of heterogeneous and...