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Mechanism design with information acquisition

Bikhchandani, Sushil; Obara, Ichiro - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 63 (2017) 3, pp. 783-812

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011740057

Yardstick competition and franchise bidding : a comparative analysis based on asymmetric information

Harada, Shumpei; Yamauchi, Hirotaka - In: Hitotsubashi journal of commerce & management 48 (2014) 1, pp. 31-42

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285005

Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition

Golrezaei, Negin; Nazerzadeh, Hamid - In: Operations research 65 (2017) 1, pp. 130-144

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011648891

Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information

Yamashita, Takuro - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013489788

Industry-optimal information in a search market

Hu, Ju - 2022 - This version: December 14, 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053833

Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers : an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

Guo, Huiyi - In: Journal of economic theory 183 (2019), pp. 76-105

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131296

Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments

Noda, Shunya - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 39-69

We study full surplus extraction and implementation in dynamic environments. We exploit intertemporal correlations of agents' types to construct within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we formulate one-shot environments, in which a single agent has a hidden type and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020290

Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction

Guo, Huiyi - In: Games and economic behavior 145 (2024), pp. 263-284

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014545426

On the performance of the Crémer-McLean auction : an experiment

Nishimura, Takeshi; Hanaki, Nobuyuki - 2024

-standing concern in the literature. We tackle this problem by experimentally testing the performance of an FE auction, which is a … second-price (2P) auction with lotteries. In the FE treatment, overbid amounts given entry increased and entry rates … causes of failure in the FE, we take an evolutionary-game approach. The FE auction with risk-neutral bidders has exactly two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015141891

Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition

Li, Yunan - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453050