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Standard auctions are known to be a revenue-maximizing way to sell an object under broad conditions when buyers are symmetric and have independent private valuations. We show that when buyers have interdependent valuations, auctions may lose their advantage, even if symmetry and independence of...
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Most of the literature on auctions with endogenous entry assumes that, in equilibrium, the number of entrants is deterministic. We discuss a series of experiments designed to test the alternative hypothesis that, even in equilibrium, the number of entrants is stochastic. This distinction has...
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We study how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where bidders possess two-dimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our...
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